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Hicks, in The Theory of Wages (1932), introduced the hypothesis of induced innovation –
change in relative factor prices can spur innovation to more effective implementation of
the factor that has become relatively more expensive.  Hayami and Ruttan (1970) tested
the induced innovation hypothesis as a macroeconomic principle and provided substantial
evidence of its validity.  Considerable research has been conducted since Hayami and
Ruttan to test the induced innovation hypothesis in the agricultural sector in many
countries.  Through the early 1990s, most reported tests supported the hypothesis (e.g.,
Binswanger 1974; Kawagoe, Otsuka, and Hayami 1986; Kuroda 1987; Yuhn 1991; Lin
1991; Terrel 1993).  More recent research using different and generally improved testing
procedures have generated mixed conclusions and raised skepticism about the validity of
the hypothesis (e.g., Clark and Youngblood 1992; Machado 1995; Olmstead and Rhode
1993, 1998; Thirtle, Townsend, and van Zyl 1998; Oniki 2000; Thirtle,
Schimmelpfennig, and Townsend 2002).  In this context of ambiguity about the
hypothesis as a stylized fact in agriculture, this paper investigates whether the induced
innovation hypothesis, or “innovation offsets” as described by Porter and van der Linde
(1995), could provide a plausible explanation for a recent paradox evident in the
bluegrass seed industry in the State of Washington.
In 1996, Washington implemented a three-year phase-in of a permanent ban on
burning bluegrass stubble.  The ban was mandated by the state legislature and
implemented by the Washington Department of Ecology after linking bluegrass field
1burning to increased patient loads at Spokane area hospitals and greater suffering by
people with respiratory problems (Washington Department of Ecology, 1996).  Prior to
1996, bluegrass stubble was burned after harvest in order to remove thatch, control weeds
and pests, increase yields by shocking the crown of this perennial plant.  Industry
representatives vehemently opposed the ban, claiming that the higher costs faced by
farmers who were forced to remove thatch mechanically would drive the bluegrass seed
industry from Washington.   
Nearly all of the bluegrass seed grown in the United States is grown in
Washington, Oregon, and Idaho.  Oregon had already imposed a partial ban on burning
before 1996, but Idaho had no ban and still does not.  So, because of the relatively close
alternative locations where bluegrass seed could be grown at a lower marginal cost, a
substantial reduction in Washington bluegrass seed production was anticipated
1. 
Surprisingly, the impending doom of the Washington bluegrass seed industry
never materialized.  Washington production during the years 1997 – 2003 was the highest
of any seven-year period in recorded history of the industry.  In each of four consecutive
years, 1999 – 2002, production was higher than in any year prior to the ban. 
This paper seeks to explain this seeming economic paradox.  Marginal cost had to
increase due to the ban; otherwise alternative production practices would have already
been selected and in use before 1996.  Yet not only did production fail to decrease, it
actually increased.  Several hypotheses consistent with economic theory are put forward
and systematically investigated in this paper.  Any of the hypotheses, if valid, could
2individually or collectively explain this economic paradox.  Listed in the order they are
tested, our hypotheses are the following:
1. Bluegrass seed price increased,
2. Competitive crop prices decreased relative to bluegrass seed price,
3. Reported data were measured with error and the correct data were
consistent with hypothesis 1 or 2, and/or
4. New techniques were introduced contemporaneously with the imposition
of the ban and effectively reduced the marginal cost of bluegrass seed
production.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we will describe the data used in
order to provide background for the discussion of the methods used to test the
hypotheses.  We report our empirical results and summarize our conclusions in the final





rd hypotheses are tested using state-level data, primarily from NASS-
Washington (WASS), for the period 1975-2003.  Crop acreage and production are
marketing-year totals.  Crop prices are marketing-year average prices, calculated by
WASS.  The wheat price variable is the sum of government payments per bushel to
Washington wheat farmers and the marketing-year average cash price for wheat.  Wheat
payment data for 1975-1992 are from a special tabulation prepared by the Farm Services
Agency, Kansas City, and wheat payment data for 1992-2003 are from the Farm Services
3Agency, Spokane.  Both are annual datasets.  Because state input prices are not
sufficiently comprehensive, we use an annual U.S. index of prices paid by farmers for
commodities, interest, taxes and wage rates.  This price index is from NASS, for the
period 1975 – 2003.
To test the 3
rd hypothesis we use statewide bluegrass seed production data from
the Census of Agriculture for the years 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997.  While WASS
collects production data from farmers through voluntary surveys, farmers are legally
required to participate in the census.  Thus, the census data are used to assess the quality
of the WASS data.
Data for rainfall at the Spokane airport was collected and compiled from a
monthly dataset from the National Climate Data Center.
To test the 4
th hypothesis, we use annual county-level acreage and production data
from WASS, for the period 1985 – 2003.
Method of Analysis
Hypothesis 1.  Our first hypothesis is that an increase in bluegrass seed price caused an
increase in bluegrass seed production.  The possibility that hypothesis 1 provides a
plausible explanation for the post-ban increase in bluegrass production is initially tested
using a simple cobweb model with bluegrass seed price as the only economic variable.  A
linear model is estimated in which harvested acreage of Washington bluegrass seed (y) is
regressed on three variables: a variable representing the proportion of fields statewide to
which the burning ban applies (x1), rainfall in the major production area of the state (x2),
4and expected bluegrass seed price normalized (i.e., divided) by an index of prices paid for
factors of production (p3): 
(1) yt = 0 + 1x1t + 2x2t + 3p3t + t
where  represents the parameters to be estimated,  is the error term, and the subscript t
identifies observation year. 
Because the burning ban was phased in between 1996 and 1998, x1t takes a value
of 1 for each year the full ban was in effect (1998 - 2003), a value of 2/3 in 1997, a value
of 1/3 in 1996, and a value of 0 for all years prior to 1996.  Prior to the burning ban, most
(80% of statewide production and acreage) bluegrass seed was produced on dryland farms
in Eastern Washington and still is mainly harvested in July and August, so the variable x2t
is the recorded rainfall at the Spokane airport from September of year t-1 through July of
year t.  We use rainfall at the Spokane airport to capture broad climatic effects on
bluegrass seed production.  Also, Spokane county historically accounted for over 50% of
statewide bluegrass seed acreage.  In the traditional dryland production area, it takes a
year to establish a bluegrass stand, so no seed is harvested until the second year.  In
addition, bluegrass seed price has historically been highly volatile (see figure 1).
Consequently, the numerator of p3 is specified as a three-year moving average of
Washington bluegrass seed prices and lagged two years to reflect expected price at the
time of planting (2 years before the first harvest).  Expected bluegrass seed price is
normalized by an index of current input prices to maintain the hypothesis of zero
homogeneity as implied by theory for a price-taking, profit-maximizing firm.
2  
5To be consistent with economic theory, bluegrass acreage is expected to respond
positively to changes in expected output price, i.e., β3 > 0.  With β3 > 0, hypothesis 1
would provide a plausible explanation for the increase in bluegrass seed production if β1
< 0 in this model.  That is, if β3 > 0, then the model conforms to theory, and a negative
estimated value for β1 would indicate that the burning ban adversely affected harvested
acreage.  We test hypothesis 1 by estimating the parameters of (1) using OLS and testing
the hypothesis, β1 < 0.  
Hypothesis 2.  If support is not found for hypothesis 1, a second plausible
hypothesis is that bluegrass seed production increased due to a decrease in competitive
crop prices relative to bluegrass seed price.  To test hypothesis 2, we develop three
models using alternative functional forms and specifications.  The dependent variable in
each model is bluegrass seed production, harvested acres of bluegrass seed, or one of
their logarithms.  The independent variables include the same variables as in equation (1)
plus expected prices of principal alternative crops –wheat (p4), lentils (p5), and dry edible
peas (p6).  
Lagged output prices are used as expected prices for the alternative crops.  Prices
are normalized by the current index of prices paid for factors of production to maintain
the homogeneity hypothesis.  The models are estimated using ordinary least squares for
individual acreage equations and seemingly unrelated regression for the system of supply
equations.  
The first two models used to test this hypothesis are specified in linear and
loglinear form:  
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The third model used to test this hypothesis is a system of output supply equations
based on the normalized quadratic profit function:
(4)

   
 































h j h j
j h h j h hj
j j
j j j j
z p
p p x x p x

     
where π is returns over variable costs normalized by the index of prices paid for factors of
production.  Note that the time subscript has been omitted to reduce notational clutter.
The partial derivatives of this function give output supply equations, which are linear in
parameters.  The system is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression, with
restrictions to preserve the symmetry of cross-partial derivatives as implied by a twice-
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where the xk values (for k = 3,…,6) are the quantities produced of the respective
commodity (x3 is bluegrass seed, x4 is wheat, x5 is lentils and x6 is dry peas).  
For the models defined in equations (2) and (3), a negative value of the estimated
parameter for the burning ban, β1, along with estimated parameters that conform to theory
for the other variables (i.e. positive value for bluegrass seed price and rainfall, and
negative values for prices of alternative crops), would support hypothesis 2.  Similarly,
7for the model described by equation (5), a negative estimated value of β31, which is the
parameter associated with the burning ban in the bluegrass seed production equation,
along with theoretically correct parameters on other variables, would support hypothesis
2.
Hypothesis 3.  If support is not found for hypothesis 2, the third hypothesis
purports that the lack of support is due to flawed data.  Hypothesis 3 was put forward
based on industry assertions that the NASS-Washington data were flawed by the
voluntary nature of the reporting.  To test this hypothesis, we first accept that, while the
harvested acreage time series from NASS-Washington (WASS) is the most complete and
extensive data set available, it is possibly flawed.  The Census of Agriculture (COA) data
is generally accepted as being more nearly correct, owing to the fact that farmers are
legally required to participate and to report accurately.  However, the census is only
administered every four or five years.  Consequently, our solution is to use the COA data
to benchmark the WASS data at approximately 5-year intervals in order to develop two
alternative data sets for hypothesis testing.  The same model specifications and functional
forms used to test hypothesis 2 are repeated using these data sets to test hypothesis 3.  
The first adjustment scheme is a linear adjustment in which we assume the COA
data represent truth.  We follow rather standard interpolation procedures by applying the
following formula to the WASS data from non-census years:
(6) ) ( ) (
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8where wi are WASS observations; ci are COA observations; w0 and wn correspond to two
successive observations, c0 and cn, in the COA data set; ai are the adjusted observations;
and n is the number of data points between successive COA observations.  Since the
COA data are assumed to be measured without error, they are not changed.  The above
formula can only be applied to the set of data points in the WASS data that correspond to
years after the 1978 census and before the 1997 census.  The leading and terminating
entries in the potentially flawed data set, which either precede or follow years that have
census data, are adjusted with a simple percentage adjustment which is proportional to the
difference between the first or last census data point and the corresponding WASS data
point.  The resulting data set consists of adjusted data points for non-census years,
interspersed with the actual census data.
The second approach is to use a linear regression model to adjust the data.  For
this adjustment, we assume that the flawed data can be used to describe reality in the
following model:
(7) gi = μ0 + μ1 wi + εi
where the gi variables form a data set constructed from the WASS data by replacing the
observations made in census years with the corresponding census observation, and
repeating those observations ten times, in order to have, roughly, twice as many census-
year observations as non-census-year observations in the regression; w is the WASS data,
with the WASS observations in census years repeated ten times, to match the dependent
variable; and μ0 and μ1 are unknown parameters to be estimated.  We repeat the census
year observations to give more weight to the census information in the estimation stage of
9this data adjustment.  We then use the estimated parameters to predict the adjusted data
set, g*.  
Each of these adjusted data sets is then used in the models previously used to test
hypothesis 2, which are described by equations (2), (3) and (5).  As with the testing of
hypothesis 2, and subject to theoretically expected signs on other parameters, negative
values for the parameter associated with the burning ban variable obtained from estimates
using adjusted data would provide support for hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4.  Our 4
th hypothesis is that new techniques were introduced
contemporaneously with the burning ban and effectively reduced the marginal cost of
bluegrass seed production.  Hypothesis 4 is examined both by reliable but anecdotal data
and a statistical model to determine geographic effects of the ban within the state.  The
latter is used to indirectly test the hypothesis.
This final hypothesis could provide a plausible explanation only if innovations
became available contemporaneously with the implementation of the ban on burning.
Such innovations would have to allow farmers to more effectively produce bluegrass
seed, i.e., at lower marginal cost, while abstaining from stubble burning.  Anecdotal
evidence from the industry suggests that new crop rotation techniques and watering
techniques were developed in the mid-1990s that allowed farmers to grow bluegrass seed
on irrigated farms more efficiently than on dryland farms where most bluegrass seed had
been traditionally grown.  A major rotation discovery occurred during this time that
bluegrass could be effectively rotated with irrigated potatoes if bluegrass was raised as an
annual or biannual crop.  When bluegrass was removed that quickly, stubble burning was
10not needed and the sod could be broken up more easily to plant potatoes.  The new
irrigation technology included gear drives for pivots and more precise water and fertilizer
application capability. 
Unfortunately, the available data series are too short and too aggregate to permit a
formal test of the induced innovation hypothesis using either econometric or time series
procedures.  Therefore, we implement an alternative testing procedure to indirectly test
implications of the purported innovations.  The goal is to determine if the anecdotal
evidence can be corroborated.  The anecdotal evidence from the industry implies that
production of bluegrass seed would shift from the dryland farms in Eastern Washington
to irrigated farms in Central Washington in order to implement the new watering and
rotation techniques.  We develop two systems of equations to model bluegrass seed
production and harvested acreage of bluegrass seed in dryland and irrigated areas of the
state.  The induced innovation hypothesis is corroborated if the ban variable in these
models is estimated to have a negative effect on bluegrass seed production and harvested
acreage in dryland areas and a positive effect on production and acreage in irrigated areas,
i.e. we find support for the induced innovation if βD1 < 0 and βI1 > 0 in the following
equations.
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11where xDt and yDt are, respectively, the quantity of bluegrass seed produced and the acres
harvested in year t in counties where farms are predominantly not irrigated (Spokane,
Whitman, and Garfield counties), and xIt and yIt are, respectively, the quantity of bluegrass
seed produced and the harvested acreage in year t in counties where farms are
predominantly irrigated.  We estimate (8) and (9) separately (for j = D, I) using OLS.
Unfortunately, WASS has only been collecting county-level bluegrass production data
since 1985, so we are restricted to 19 observations for this estimation.  Also, in order to
not divulge an individual firm's production, WASS is legally restricted from revealing
county production data for an individual county if the number of producers is below a
certain level.  So, in the WASS data set, production from these counties is aggregated in
an “other” category.  The counties for which we have individual data are Spokane,
Whitman, Garfield, and Adams.  Spokane, Whitman, and Garfield counties contain the
vast majority of non-irrigated bluegrass seed farms in Washington, and most farms in
Adams county are irrigated.  We use the data from Adams county and the “other”
category as a proxy for data on irrigated farms.  Counties that do not have data reported
for every year from 1985 – 2003 are not included in this estimation. 
Empirical Results
The hypothesis that an increase in bluegrass seed price caused the increase in bluegrass
seed production is easily dismissed.  The average price of bluegrass seed was lower
($0.74/lb) during the seven-year period 1997-2003 than for either of the two previous
seven-year periods or for the 22-year period 1975-1996.  This conclusion is also
12supported by the estimates of equation (1), which are reported in table 1.  Even with the
inclusion of bluegrass seed price, which was not statistically significant, this first
regression estimates that the burning ban had a positive and highly significant effect on
harvested bluegrass seed acreage.
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients for the linear and log-linear models.  The
estimated signs of the coefficients agree with our expectations of the models, except for
the coefficient on the burning ban variable, which is positive and significant at a 5% level
in the estimation of the linear model, and positive, but insignificant in the estimation of
the log-linear model.  With alternative crop prices included in the model, bluegrass seed
price is significant in both specifications (at the 1% level in the linear model).  The
rainfall parameter is estimated to be positive in both models and significant in the log-
linear model.  The estimates for the alternative crops are all negative, implying that each
is a substitute commodity for bluegrass seed.  Only the coefficient on wheat price is
significant in the linear model, and wheat and lentil prices are significant in the log-linear
model.  Note that the adjusted R
2 value increases from .61 to greater than .86 when
substitute crop prices are included as independent variables in equation (2).
With the exception of the positive parameter on the burning ban variable, the
estimates of the log-linear model agree fairly well with our expectations, and nearly all
variables are significant.  The burning ban does not have a negative effect on bluegrass
seed acreage in either model, so neither equation supports hypothesis 2.
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the system of supply equations described
by equation (5) and estimated using the unadjusted statewide WASS dataset.  These
13results are obtained by stacking the four equations and estimating them as a seemingly
unrelated regression system, while maintaining the cross-equation restrictions implied by
the quadratic profit function.  The parameter estimates are fully consistent with
theoretical expectations with regard to prices.  Own-price parameters are positive in each
equation, implying upward sloping supply curves, and are significant in all but the
bluegrass seed equation.  The parameter estimates are also consistent with a profit
function that is convex in prices.  However, these results do not lend any support to our
hypothesis, as the burning ban variable in the bluegrass seed production equation is again
estimated to be positive and significant.  
Estimation of models (2) and (3) with alternative data sets does not significantly
affect the results.  Columns (i) and (ii) of table 4 report the results of estimation of the
linear model with the data adjusted according to equation (6) (the linear adjustment) and
with data adjusted according to equation (7) (the regression adjustment), respectively.
Columns (iii) and (iv) report the results of estimation of the log-linear model with data
adjusted according to the linear and regression adjustments, respectively.  The fact that
results in this table do not differ appreciably from those in table 2 in sign, magnitude, or
significance (except for rainfall in the linear equations and lentil price in one of the log-
linear equations) indicate that measurement error is not the cause of the apparent increase
in bluegrass seed production following burning ban.  We note that estimation results of
the system of supply equations with the adjusted data did not differ in any substantive
way from those reported in table 3, and are not reported here.
14The results of estimation of our final model are presented in table 5.  Except in the
dryland production equation, the burning ban variable is significant at the 10% level in
each equation.  It is estimated to be negative for dryland production and acreage and
positive for irrigated production and acreage.  The signs of other parameters also comply
fully with expectations, but few variables have a significant impact on regional bluegrass
seed acreage or supply. 
We argue that these results support our fourth hypothesis with the following
reasoning.  The innovations that occurred contemporaneously with the burning ban are
entirely associated with irrigated farming practices.  Dryland farmers, therefore, faced an
increase in marginal cost of production, and should have decreased production
accordingly.  At the same time, the purported innovations would have decreased the
marginal cost of production of bluegrass seed on irrigated farms.  Farmers on irrigated
land should have, therefore, increased production of bluegrass seed.  Using the results
shown in table 4, we can reliably assert that bluegrass seed acreage and production
decreased dramatically in dryland areas of the state after the burning ban, and that this
decrease was offset by an increase in acreage and production of bluegrass seed in areas of
the state where farms are irrigated. 
Conclusions
New environmental regulations inevitably and justifiably cause anxiety and apprehension
among affected parties over the predicted effects of regulation.  In this paper, we
examined an example of regulation for which the consequences were the opposite of
15sound economic predictions and were actually favorable to vocal opponents of the new
law.  
We found that the induced innovation hypothesis can at least partially explain why
simple observation and more complex econometric models of bluegrass seed production
in Washington state indicate that the ban on field burning, at worst, had no aggregate
effect on industry production, and, at best, strengthened the industry.  The estimation of
our final model suggests that the burn ban was accompanied by a migration in production
from the traditional dryland farms in Eastern Washington to irrigated farms in the
Columbia Basin.  This movement in production was a necessary result of reported
innovations in bluegrass seed farming technology because the innovations were
associated with irrigated farming and cannot be implemented on dryland farms.  As we
are unable to conduct a formal test of the induced innovation hypothesis, this final
estimation serves as the best evidence available that technological innovation allowed
farmers to produce bluegrass seed more efficiently after the burn ban.  While the effect of
technological innovation offset the negative effect of the ban on statewide production,
and benefited bluegrass seed processors, it is important to note that the predictions of a
decrease in bluegrass seed production (see, for example Wandschneider, et al., 1998) held
true for areas of the state where farmers could not implement the new technology.
16Footnotes
1 The most optimistic of the forecasts (Wandschneider, et al. 1998) included several
possible scenarios and  predicted a decrease in Washington acreage devoted to bluegrass
seed production ranging from minimal to 30%.  
2 This hypothesis is an implication of economic theory only for price-taking, profit-
maximizing firms and is not necessarily an implication for geographic aggregates of such
firms.  However, nonparametric tests conducted by Lim and Shumway failed to reject the
hypothesis that the aggregate of all agricultural firms in Washington behaved as though
they were a single price-taking, profit-maximizing firm (1992).
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Figure 1.  Washington bluegrass seed price, 1975-2003





















Note:  numbers in parentheses are p-values














































Note:  numbers in parentheses are p-values
 




































































Note:  system R
2  = .9472.  Sample size = 26.  Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
24Table 4.  Estimation of Acreage Models, Equations (2) and (3), with Linearly- and Regression-
Adjusted Data
Variable
Equation (2) Equation (3)






































































Note:  numbers in parentheses are P-values.  Columns (i) and (iii) report results of estimation with
data adjusted according to equation (6), and columns (ii) and (iv) report results of estimation with
data adjusted according to equation (7).
26Table 5.  Estimation of Systems of Regional Acreage and Supply Equations,









































































Note:  numbers in parentheses are P-values.
27